The dependency of society and business on telecommunication services is commonly recognized, but is this conception taken into account in our effort towards smarter and more autonomous networks? The objective of the paper is to discuss some dependability issues in the context of these networks and to pinpoint some challenges. As an introduction, a brief review of dependability concepts is given. Next the following issues are discussed: a) strategies for providing a survivable transport network; b) fault-tolerant network nodes vs. faulttolerant functionality on a distributed platform; c) software faults and their consequences like error propagation and network wide failure modes.
INTRODUCTION
Many foresee a future where we will have a ÒdigitalÓ existence in cyberspace that will be an integrated part of our private, social and professional life. Even if this future scenario does not become true, it is beyond doubt that our social and economic welfare is and will become increasingly more dependent on information and communication technology. However, when we pursue new technologies toward smarter networks, do we have in mind that we are going to thrust our welfare to the technology we are developing? Do we take into account that equipment may fail, that information may be deliberately or accidentally corrupted, that the environment may knock-out parts of the network, and that logical ßaws in speciÞcation, design and implementation may cause instability and breakdown of an entire network?
History has shown that when failures may lead to disasters, the society tends to become conservative with respect to introducing new technology when a proven technology exists. In this situation, the technology deployment trend tends to be more towards marginal improvements than to introduce radically new solutions. The rather circumspect introduction of IN during the past decade may serve as an example. It should also be kept in mind that the additional cost of making a network dependable is similar to the cost of providing its basic functionality. To become a useful technology, smart networks must meet the above outlined conservatism and high cost, and be smart enough to deal with physical and logical faults in an economic and robust manner.
The objective of this paper is to introduce and discuss some issues concerning the dependability related to the coming networks. These challenges has been somewhat overlooked in the network research society. The dependability of the circuit switched communication infrastructure is taken for granted and up to recently, none has trusted their welfare on the Internet. Security issues, arising from intentionally man-made faults/intrusions, is recognized and put on the research agenda. Remember, however, that ÔnatureÕ causing unintentional physical and logical faults may be more inventive than man. This paper concentrates on these faults of the transport and control parts as the network as illustrated in Figure 1 . In Section 3, the various options for making the transport part of the network tolerant to link and node failures are presented and trade-off with respect to speed and efÞcient use of spare capacity are discussed. How to provide fault tolerant service, control and management functionality are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents some observations of the effect of logical faults in network and points out this as a potential cause for major network outages. First, however, the basic dependability concepts are brießy revisited in the next section. T r a n s p o r t C o n t r o l , m a n a g m n t .
S e r v i c e s 
DEPENDABILITY
Dependability may be deÞned as the trustworthiness of a system such that reliance can justiÞably be placed on the service it delivers [6] . A service delivered by a system is its behaviour, as it is perceived by its users. A user is another system (human or technical) which interacts with the former. For a more comprehensive introduction to dependability concepts, it is referred to [24] 1 .
Concepts
From an engineering point of view, we are left with the following questions: ÒWhat causes a system to be less than 100% trustworthy?Ó, ÒHow should this, less than 100%, trustworthiness be quantiÞed?Ó and ÒHow should a required trustworthiness be achieved and assessed?Ó To handle these questions three classes of notions are introduced as illustrated in Figure 2 : ¥ Impairments to dependability: faults, errors and failures, as well as their causes, consequences and characteristics. Impairments will be discussed in Section 2.2. ¥ Means to achieve reliability by fault avoidance and fault tolerance, see Section 2.3, and the means to validate and reach conÞdence in the result, like testing evaluation by modelling and mathematical analysis or simulation.
1. Other deÞnitions exist. See for instance [16] . Figure 2 . The dependability tree, linking various aspects of dependability [24] .
¥ Attributes of a system which describe the properties of a system with respect dependability, and whose quantiÞcation determine its dependability. The attributes may be regarded as the following abilities of a system: Availability: to provide a set of services at a given instant of time or at any instant within a given time interval. Reliability: to provide uninterrupted service.
Safety:
to provide service without the occurrence of catastrophic failures. Security :
to prevent unauthorized access to and/or handling of information. It is seen that the a quantiÞcation of the dependability attributes are signiÞ-cant QoS parameters of a system«s service together with performance/trafÞc related parameters as for instance response time and delay.
Fault, errors and failures
Fault, error and failure are words which in daily language are used interchangeably and mean that something does not work, is incorrect, etc. However, in dependability engineering they denote separate phases from cause to consequence as illustrated in Figure 3 . Starting with the consequence: ¥ Failure: delivery of incorrect service or the transition from correct service delivery to incorrect. A failure is a manifestation of an error that we observe on the outside of a system. ¥ Error: a system state that is liable to lead to failure, i.e. the manifestation of a fault within a system. ¥ Fault: the cause of an error. Note that faults may have a multitude of physical and human causes and be of various kinds as illustrated to the right in Figure 4 .
This cause to consequence chain may be applied recursively with respect to both the development, deployment and operation, and the system structure. For instance: a misconception in a software developers head (fault) may lead to a wrong design (error) that results in the production of incorrect code (fail- ure). This incorrect code represent a (dormant) fault in the system which when activated produces an error, which again may cause a failure of the system. Often, only permanent hardware faults that are considered when the dependability of a system is regarded. This leads to a gross overestimation of the dependability, since these faults are the least frequent cause of failures. Human made logical (e.g. software) and operational faults as well as transient faults are far more frequent. See for instance [2, 10, 21] .
Fault-tolerance
There are two basic approaches to obtain dependable systems, fault avoidance and fault tolerance. The basic principles are illustrated in Figure 4 . In the fault avoidance approach, we seek to avoid the faults, e.g. by extensive quality assurance of the software, benign operating conditions for the hardware, etc. In the fault tolerant approach, the system is given a structure and mechanisms, which prevent errors in the system to manifest themselves as failures. A number of mature and well known techniques exist, e.g. FEC (forward error correcting codes) or CRC (cyclic redundancy check) combined with retransmission of errored packets to tolerate transient transmission faults. Other techniques is rerouting of trafÞc when network links and nodes fail, as introduced in Section 3 and replication of computing functionality as dealt with in Section 4. Introductions to fault tolerant design may for instance be found in [3, 17, 18, 26 Chap. 14, 28, 37] . Below, the options for fault-tolerance in smart network will be discussed. Neither fault avoidance nor fault tolerance comes cheap, and it is not straight forward to obtain a dependable network. Hence, smart networks should be inherently robust, i.e. fault tolerance of network services should be simple to achieve and do not require more additional development effort and deployed equipment than strictly necessary. Preferably smart networks should also minimize the deployment and operation efforts as pursued in the plug-and-play architecture [1] .
SURVIVABLE TRANSPORT
Various fault-tolerance strategies are employed to achieve dependable transport networks. There are three important issues in the choice of strategy: ¥ The redundant network elements and capacity needed, i.e. the additional equipment cost required to implement the scheme; ¥ The duration from the failure of a network element and until the transport service is restored; ¥ Centralized or decentralized control. Control by a dedicated management functionality or as an integrated part of the trafÞc handling. In this section, three basic strategies, which differ with respect to the above listed issues are presented. Section 3.4 gives a brief discussion of these in the layered architecture and fault handling in transport networks.
Protection
Protection is the simplest form of fault tolerance of the transport service between to nodes of a network, where a dedicated spare path is established. There may be intermediate nodes as indicated in the Þgure, but these do not perform any switching or rerouting of the protected trafÞc. The principle is, as illustrated in the Þgure, that the trafÞc between two nodes follows two (or more) dedicated paths. To have independent failing, the paths must be physically disjoint. In Disjoint physical paths some cases this is sought achieved by minimum physical distance (e.g., 1.5 meters) of the cables combined with other means for physical separation. It is three types of protection switching: a) 1+1 protection: The bit stream is sent synchronously on both paths toward the destination. The destination selects the bit stream it considers as the one with the higher integrity, i.e., fewer bit errors. It is ensured that path failures are detected by coding techniques, loss of signal, loss of synchronization, etc. The advantage of 1+1 protection is, as with all masking redundancy techniques, an immediate (in the order of a few ms) handling of path failures. A path failure should be unnoticed by the users of the transport service. b) 1:1Ó and Ò1:N protection: are stand by protection strategies, where a dedicated spare (or back-up) path is available for one and active paths respectively. Failure detection techniques are as for the masking redundancy, but the receiving node must inform the sending node which redirects the data stream. This incurs a temporary loss of service (in the order of 10 -100 ms), but is usually tolerated by the end-user (applications).
In conclusion the restoration is simple, fast and proven, but requires more transmission capacity (but less costly control) than the (smarter) alternatives outlined below.
ReconÞguration
The reconÞguration strategy is based upon a centralized management of the network. A network management system, see Figure 6 , supervises and controls all network resources. It seeks to keep a map of all network resources, their utilization and status. Based on this information, it sets up transmission paths between nodes in the network. When a network failure occurs, the network management system reconÞgures the routing through the network.
This strategy has the potential to use the transmission capacity in the network very efÞciently due to its ability to perform a global optimization. ReconÞguration may, however, be slow, in the order of minutes, due to the time needed for data collection, deciding upon a new conÞguration, and propagating the new conÞguration back to the switches. The strategy is vulneraSimultaneous synch. transfer Dedicated back-up path N ble, since it is both centralized and depends on information transfer in a network with failure(s) not yet handled. To overcome these drawbacks, parts of the management functionality are sought distributed, see for instance [7] .
Self-healing
Self-healing is used as common nominator for a range of strategies which have in common that they have distributed control and requires no dedicated pre-reserved transmission capacity. The next subsections present three basic techniques. The two Þrst are, as protection and reconÞguration, associated with transmission paths in the network, while rerouting in Section 3.3.3 is associated with the individual connections/streams.
Back-up paths
When a path (the active) is established through the network one or more back-up (stand-by) paths are established simultaneously. This/these back-up path(s) may be completely or partially disjoint from the active. A back up path does not carry any trafÞc unless a node or link along the active fails. Transmission resources along a back-up path may be assigned on-demand when an active path failure occurs. In this case, trafÞc may be lost if sufÞcient capacity are unavailable. Hence, if the network shall meet dependability/QoS requirements, semidedicated resources must be reserved. See Figure 7 for an example. The link [i, k] carries the active path between nodes i and k and has reserved stand-by capacity for either the active path {i, n} or the active the path {i, m, s}. Since these paths have no common network element except the originating node i, failures of these two active paths are assumed independent.
A path failure is detected in the end-nodes, for instance by missing OAM cells in an ATM connection. When resources on stand-by paths are available, the service may be restored in the order of 10 -100 ms. A challenge is to allocate and adapt the back-up paths so the spare capacity in the network is optimally used under a given trafÞc load.
Flooding
Flooding is a fully distributed network management technique to restore communication after an element failure. The technique has got its name since it ßoods the network with request in the search for available capacity to replace that of a failed link. No resource reservation is made ahead of the reconÞguration, but the network must be dimensioned so that spare capacity is available. There are four variants of the method, dependent on whether: ¥ A new path restored by diverting the affected paths around the failed network elements failed, i.e., span restoration , or whether a new path is established between the source and destination node, i.e., end-to-end restoration . See the illustration to the right for examples. ¥ The search for a new (unidirectional) path starts form one node and terminates in the other, i.e., single search , or starts in both nodes and terminates when the searches Òmeet in the middleÓ, i.e., double search. Flooding, especially end-to-end restoration, poses a number of algorithmic problems on how to reserve and release capacity to avoid deadlocks and to make an efÞcient use of the available resources in the network. The service restoration time is at least several seconds, and no dependability/QoS guarantees may be given, since no reservations are made.
Rerouting
This self-healing strategy is executed on the connection level. The trafÞc through the network Þnds new routes between source and destination end systems when a network element fails, i.e. by directing the packets (in connectionless communication) along new routes, or re-establishing the end-toend connections along a new route. See Figure 8 for an illustration. Note that in this strategy, individual packets/connections are rerouted or re-established. This is different from the self healing strategies presented above, as well as protection and reconÞguration, which is aimed at restoring the end-to-end paths of the network after an element failure. Each path may carry a number of individual end-user connections and/or messages between end-users. This path rerouting/re-establishment may be considered as a bulk restoration of the transport capacity by the network itself without involving the end-systems, and where it is an objective that the fault handling should be as Òinvisi-bleÓ to the end-user (applications) as possible. Applying rerouting, this near transparency of network faults to the end-user (systems) will be lost, no dependability/QoS guarantees can be made and: -the end-user application will stop, which may be critical for some applications, e.g., tele-medicine, -longer time is needed before a service may be re-established after a failure, e.g., a new connection must be made or a period with large packet losses and/or delays will arise in connectionless networks, -the network may be temporarily overloaded with connection requests or repeated packets after a failure, and -semipermanent connections established by the management system, e.g., leased lines, require special attention. The are also a number of advantages by utilizing this strategy: + less functionality is needed in the network since ordinary trafÞc handling functions are used for network element failures, + the routing algorithm used for rerouting after a network element failure, may be the same algorithm used to adapt to normal ßuctuations of the trafÞc load, like daily variations and overloads, + the restoration is distributed (unless a centralized routing function is introduced) and hence, no centralized function forms a dependability bottleneck, + the path restorations are end-to-end and the information ßows that shall be restored have a Þner granularity, which yields a better resource utilization. Table 1summarizes some of the basic implementation issues related to the redundancy strategies discussed hereto in Section 3. Transport networks has typically a layered design, at least a physical layer, a transmission (link) layer and a switching layer. These layers may contain sublayers, e.g. the ATM virtual path and connection layers. In which of these layers should we introduce the fault tolerance? What fault-tolerance strategy should be used? Since the layers are designed independently of each other, how should we avoid introducing excessive spare capacity and avoiding that several layers compete to handle the same failure?
Multilevel fault handling
An exaggerated illustration of the problem is given in Figure 9 . For instance, the cross-connect switching carried out by the SDH transport system, may alternatively be carried out by the ATM VP layer. If we are interested in IP transport, why do we not get rid of all the underlying layers and use IP-over-light? The answers to these questions are complicated by the fact that: ¥ in contradiction to what is illustrated in Figure 9 , networks are not homogeneously and strictly layered end-to-end. For instance, an IP network may span several underlying networks; ¥ the lower layers may carry several independent transport services; ¥ all transport services (as well as end-users) do not have the same dependability requirements and hence the same need for fault-tolerance in the network.
For discussions on design of multilayer networks and on which layer that it is most proÞtable to introduce redundancy, see for [19, 20, 29 and 40] . Some rules of thumb may be given: a) The higher up in the network the larger is the ßexibility and the number of stand-by resources needed is likely to be less; b) The higher up in the network, the larger is the delay from the failure event and until the service is restored; c) Low layer redundancy handling tends to introduce the least complexity since the mechanisms may be simpler and the redundancy handling may be common to a number of higher layer network services. d) Fault tolerance on a layer can only handle fault at its level and on the levels below. Hence, some fault tolerance is required at the highest level. A closing question: with the observations of the current internet in mind [33, 22] , is the currently so popular IP-over-light scenario able to shortcut today«s multilevel fault handling and provide a fast enough reconÞgura-tion and a stable rerouting in a large network where failures are the rule more than the exception? Figure 9 .Layered network scenario with fault handling in multiple layers. 
FAULT TOLERANT NETWORK FUNCTIONS
In the previous section, the techniques for making the transport services of a network fault tolerant was discussed. This section presents two basic fault-tolerance strategies that enable network functions to be performed, uninterrupted if required, in spite of computing and data storing element failures. Network functions in this context encompass call/connection/stream control, network and service management, and service handling as illustrated in Figure 1 . The faults sought tolerated are primarily physical faults, even though some of these techniques also have been experienced to tolerate a subset of logical faults reasonably well [10] .
The two strategies regarded for achieving fault tolerance in the computing and data storage functionality are: ¥ To use fault-tolerant network nodes, i.e. to make the computing and database platforms supporting the functionality of the network nodes fault-tolerant. For instance to make an intelligent network SCP fault tolerant by using a duplicated synchronous computer to execute the functions. ¥ To introduce fault tolerance at the network level, i.e. to have co-operating replicas of software objects/processes providing network functions in several nodes and thereby enable tolerance of node failures.Network level fault-tolerance is based on dependable distributed computing technologies. The aim of the section is two view these as competing options for achieving dependability in smart networks. Hence, (too) little attention is paid to the Òin-betweenÓ systems, e.g. [34, 30] , which uses a specially designed transport network to ensure consistencies between replica.
Fault-tolerant network nodes
This strategy is illustrated in Figure 10 , where each node in the network, and the services it delivers, are made fault tolerant by having redundant computing and/or storage capacity in the node. The replicas of the processes executed or stored are located within the same node. The architecture of the nodes may vary as illustrated. Fault-tolerance may for instance be achieved by micro-synchronous duplication, see node s of Figure 10 , as in for instance the AXE [32] . Alternatively a distributed and mainly load shared architecture, see node d of Figure 10 , as in Alcatel System 12 [4] , may be applied. See for instance [3] for a discussion on the design and analysis of such systems.
As indicated by the type and age of the above references, the fault tolerant network node is the classic approach for public communication systems. This is a proven technology, and the design goal, originally set for the ESS 1 [8] , of an expected down time of three minutes per year was achieved between one and two decades ago. In addition, this approach has several advantages. In most systems, it hides the fault-tolerance mechanisms for the application designer. The synchronization between replica incurs little or no delay, and the strict real time QoS requirements of communication systems is met. However, these systems are dedicated (legacy) systems and are more expensive than off-the-shelf computer and database systems. Located at a single site these systems are vulnerable to environment failures like Þre.
Nevertheless, this is a viable approach to providing dependable network functions in a smart network, cf. for instance [15] . With respect to providing network functionality, the problems related to the handling of (physical) faults may be substantially reduced/hidden, but at a certain cost and with reduced applicability to smaller nodes.
Replication across the network
This strategy is illustrated in Figure 11 . The computing and storing hardware of the nodes in the network are not fault tolerant. The services delivered by the network, however, may be fault tolerant by having replicas of the various service providing software objects/modules in several network nodes. The replication may be handled by appropriate middelware [27] . As in the strategy of Section 4.1, this requires redundant computing and storage capacity in the network. However, off-the-shelf equipment may be used and the redundancy installed for the various object/modules may be tailored to the dependability requirements of the services they provide and the required consistency between replicas. For instance, in Figure 11 , there is three synchronous replicas of object/module A. These replicas have consistent states and by voting, an arbitrary failure of one of the replicas, as well as the node hosting it, may be tolerated. The two synchronous replicas of D and F allow a crash failure without interrupting the service. The active object/modules B and E have stand-by replicas that may take over if the active replica/node fails. The stand-by replica may have a consistent or partially consistent state with the primary, e.g. by checkpointing, or be in a default state. In the last case illustrated, C has three load-shared replicas without consistent states.
It is a common objective that replicas shall be location and fault transparent, i.e. users of the services shall not need to know where the replicas are located and whether some of the replicas has failed. Achieving a ßexible replication scheme and consistent replicas across an unreliable network is no simple task. To deal with these problems, there has for more than a decade been put considerable research effort into the management of groups of objects/processes and the communication between them. This is referred to as group communication. See [35] for a collection of papers on this issue. Various tool-kits have been developed to facilitate fault-tolerant distributed processing, e.g. Isis and Hourus/Electra [5, 36] . Mechanisms for fault-tolerance are also likely to be included in CORBA [31, 38, 39, 41] . Hence, ensuring the dependability of network control, management and service provisioning should be within reach by fault tolerance techniques developed for distributed systems.
So where is the challenge in the smart network context? The fault-tolerance and replication strategies applied must be tailored to the requirements and adapted to the particularities of telecommunications. For instance: ¥ Network operations and end-user QoS requirements put rather strict real time requirements on many tasks. The replica synchronization is based on protocols ensuring causal order [23] , which may be time consuming, especially on non-broadcast media like WANs. Figure 11 .Illustration of network where software objects are replicated on disjoint network nodes for fault tolerance.
C
¥ Many tasks carried out in a network, e.g. reservation of a communication resource, have short processing times compared to synchronization times between replicas, hence an approach must be chosen so an immense overhead can be avoided. ¥ Only a subset of the tasks performed by the network result in state changes that need to be persistent in case of failure. Some of the Internet«s success as a transport network may be attributed to its statelessness. In connection oriented networks, connections in the set-up phase has always been considered expendable when failures occur. For other tasks, persistence of the state in case of failure is of outmost importance, e.g. updates of the home location register in mobile networks.
LOGICAL FAULTS 1
The fault tolerance strategies discussed in the previous chapters are aimed at physical faults. Logical faults are however the cause of a substantial part of the failures. Failures due to logical faults may affect every aspect of the service and network operation, from aborting a single service transaction to a complete network outage. The increasing logical complexity and intervoweness of smart networks makes them more prone and vulnerable to logical faults.
In spite of extensive use of fault avoidance and validation techniques, cf. Figure 2 , logical faults, e.g. software faults, are embedded into a system during its speciÞcation, design, implementation and conÞguration. These faults stay dormant in the system until a combination of input/use of the system and internal state activates them and causes an error. For a mature system, the expected dormancy period can be several years. In the subsequent operation of the system the error may cause a failure as illustrated in Figure 12 . In dependable systems, the various modules/components are sought made robust to errors by audit routines, exception handling etc.
In this presentation, it will not be discussed how logical faults could be avoided and tolerated. The focus is instead put on how logical fault inßuences the dependability of networks, namely the persistence of errors and error propagation.
Error persistence
A common and rarely disputed assumption in the design and evaluation of dependable systems is that failures occur according to a Poisson process, i.e. failures occur independent of when the previous failures occurred and with a constant occurrence probability per time unit. However, studies of failure logs show that this is not the case, especially for logical caused failures, see for instance [25, 11] . This is demonstrated in Figure 13 , which shows the autocorrelation 1 , , of logically caused failures of a distributed communication control system.
The Þgure shows the dependency between the number failures in one interval and the number of failures in the jÕ th subsequent (or previous) interval. (The larger the deviation of is from zero, the greater the dependency.) If the failure process was a Poisson process, the autocorrelation would in 95% of the cases be within the two dotted lines of Figure 13 . It is seen that 
the failure process has a ÒmemoryÓ of more than a week. Error propagation, as will be discussed in the next section, and changes in operational conditions will also contribute to this correlation. Note also the daily variations seen in Figure 13 . The number of failures is more dependent on the number of failures at the same time during the previous day than the number of failures during the previous eight hour interval. Errors may persist in the system for a considerable period and cause a burst of failures, see also Figure 14 . Figure 13 indicated that errors tend to persist in a system and cause multiple failures. Figure 14 shows a sample from the software related failure pattern of a large distributed communication control system. It is seen that during the Þrst four days we have a normal operational mode with few failures. During the 11Õth through the 13Õth day severe bursts of failures occur, affecting several processors. These Þgures show that the failure pattern is not Poissonian, i.e. failures do not occur independently of each other. ¥ Failures tend to occur in severe bursts, i.e. if one failure is experienced, the next is likely to occur rather soon. Restarts or similar actions after a failure do not always restore the system to an error free internal state, or the internal state may be inconsistent with the rest of the system or the environment. ¥ Many processors are involved in a failure burst. If one processor fail, there is an increasing probability of failure of the cooperating processors. For an explanation of the latter phenomenon, regard the sketch of Figure 15 . Control/management/service providing subsystems span several physically separate nodes of the network. Each of these subsystems is constituted by a number of more or less tightly coupled software modules residing in the various network nodes. These modules cooperate to carry out the services of the system. Incorrect state information may be transferred from one module to another. For instance by transfer of incorrect or inconsistent data, or by a module acting on false information and thereby introducing errors in its own internal state. Hence, subsequent failures of seemingly independent physical units may occur. This phenomenon is denoted error propagation [12, 13] ; see the illustration in Figure 16 . The error propagation between modules depends on: A variant of error propagation occurs when the same logical fault is present in identical copies of software modules present in various nodes in the network. These faults may be activated by a condition spreading through the system under speciÞc circumstances, cf. the Þrst well known example [9] . The most prominent logical fault of this kind is the Y2K bug. Analysis of operational data from distributed communication control systems by cluster analysis, shows that the systems may have different operational modes as a result of the error propagation. For instance, ÒgoodÓ modes where only few sporadic failures occur and ÒbadÓ modes where many units fail repeatedly within a short time interval [14] . A mode-changing behaviour of the system may be identiÞed. The ÒbadÓ modes cripple the service offered severely and may cause instability of the entire network. Furthermore, it is illustrated how the mode-changing behaviour of the system may be described by a state model.
Error propagation
Smart networks are, due to their large logical complexity and intervoweness, exposed to persistent and propagating errors. Hence, to be dependable and have a stable operation, these must have an inherent design which ¥ enables errors to be removed when a recovery action is taken as a result of a failure; ¥ prevents error propagation between the various parts of the network.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Dependability is an important aspect of networks in the future. The availability and reliability requirements will continue to increase as our social and economic dependence on teleservices as well as the cost of failure continues to grow. Dependability constitutes a signiÞcant part of the QoS and is an important factor in the competition among service providers, network operators and equipment manufacturers. High dependability is costly to provide both with respect to development (fault-tolerance, fault management, and quality assurance), deployed equipment, and operation and maintenance. At least a doubling of Òthe basic costÓ is required if system shall reach a typical communication network component availability in the order of . New smart network technologies must be proven as dependable as Òtradi-tionalÓ network technologies before they become deployed in commercial networks. Hence, the following basic design question arises; shall proven ÒdumbÓ low level (in terms of a layered design) fault handling techniques, like protection switching and duplicated synchronous processors be used, or should new smarter technologies, which are more ßexible, and which give potentially cheaper solutions be pursued? Anyhow, the ÒdumbÓ techniques are only able to cope with physical faults. The major challenge is the logical (software) faults. The consistent design, design methodology and extensive quality assurance, currently used to restrict the number of logical faults and ensure the dependability, seem feasible only within monolithic proprietary systems as we know them to-day. In the future open, heterogeneous networks with multiple hardware and software vendors, service providers and network operators, robust and adaptive network and service components becomes a necessity. Components able to tolerate logical and physical failures of their environment and co-operating components, adapt and contribute to the provision of continued service is a major challenge in the advancement of smart networks.
